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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the occupational attainment and job mobility of permanent rural-
to-urban migrants and compares them with migrants who were born with an urban hukou. 
Using data from the 2003 China General Social Survey, we examine how much of the 
gaps in occupational-prestige scores between rural- and urban-born migrants can be 
explained by differences in observable characteristics up to the time of migration. We 
find that, with controls for these characteristics, the difference in occupational attainment 
between rural and urban migrants becomes statistically insignificant or even positive for 
some subgroups. In contrast, our analysis of job mobility reveals that rural migrants are 
generally more mobile and also more likely to move to better jobs by changing work- 
units, whereas urban migrants are more likely to be promoted within a work-unit. 
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 1. Introduction 
Since the 1980s, the rapid growth of labor demand in urban China has induced massive 
migration from rural to urban areas, and the inequality between urban residents and rural 
migrants has led to a serious social concern. The problem is exacerbated by the household 
registration system called “hukou.” In particular, the government grants different social benefits 
to families that hold an urban hukou and families that still hold a rural hukou, even if both live in 
the same city.2 In addition, a substantial literature has shown that hukou status has enlarged the 
wage inequality and occupational segregation between urban workers and rural-to-urban migrant 
workers who do not hold an urban hukou (Liu, 2005; Lu and Song, 2006; Meng and Zhang, 
2001). 
To facilitate the migration of farmers to urban areas, the government began to grant 
permissions for individuals to live and work outside of their places of hukou registration in the 
1980s. Removing the migration restriction increased the number of these temporary migrants 
sharply: the 2000 Census showed that more than 75 percent3 of the internal migrants in China 
were temporary, compared to 25 percent who were permanent migrants who transferred their 
hukou registration to the migration destination (Liang and Ma, 2004). Additionally, a sequence 
of hukou policy reforms, which took place during the 1980s and 1990s, enabled a greater number 
of rural migrants to obtain permanent urban hukou than before.4 According to Deng and 
                                                 
2. For example, rural hukou holders who live in urban areas do not have access to 
subsidized housing, subsidized medical care, and schooling for their children in the city. 
3. See Liang and Ma (2004), Table 4. There were 58,835 temporary migrants (both urban 
and rural) out of the 79,053 total migrants in China in 2000.  
4. See Chan and Buckingham (2008), Chan and Zhang (1999), and Fan (2002a, 2002b) 
for a detailed review of the hukou system and related policy. The dual classification of hukou 
registration is based on both the place of regular residence and hukou status (i.e., hukou site and 
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Gustaffson (2006), rural-born permanent urban migrants made up 20.3 percent of China’s urban 
populations in 2002. Nevertheless, the growing population of permanent rural migrants, as well 
as how these migrants assimilate into the urban labor market, have been largely ignored in the 
literature.  
The purpose of this paper is to examine the occupational attainment and job mobility of 
permanent rural-to-urban migrants who successfully obtained a local urban hukou. We 
specifically compared these rural-to-urban migrants with urban-to-urban migrants who were born 
with a hukou from a city other than where they resided at the time of data collection.5 Both 
groups were permanent migrants who obtained a hukou registration in the destination city. To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first study to explore the difference in the occupational 
attainment between permanent rural-to-urban migrants and permanent urban-to-urban migrants. 
Moreover, the urban-to-urban migrants are a better comparison group for the rural-to-urban 
migrants than urban local residents because they are both “outsiders.” Rural-to-urban and urban-
to-urban migrants differ in their original hukou type, but they both face high job-search costs and 
a segregated labor market that favors local urban residents, especially given the reform of state-
owned enterprises, in which labor policy was changed to protect local laid-off workers (Cai and 
Wang, 2007; Zhang, 2010). The comparison will shed light on whether an individual’s original 
hukou type might affect the rate of assimilation in urban areas.  
                                                                                                                                                             
hukou type; Chan and Buckingham, 2008; Chan and Zhang, 1999). Although most of the 
existing literature has used data that only allowed researchers to identify hukou type, the data 
used in our paper includes precise information on both where the hukou was registered as well as 
the origin of the migrant.  
5. We only look at those with a job prior to migration. In other words, individuals who 
migrated to urban areas for further education are not included in the analysis. The following 
section discusses the analytical framework in more detail.  
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We focus on occupational-prestige scores6 and job mobility. Specifically, we construct 
occupational-prestige scores based on the average educational attainment of workers employed 
in each occupation to capture additional, less tangible job features such as welfare and social 
status. Using retrospective employment and migration histories from the 2003 wave of the 
Chinese General Social Survey, we construct panel data of occupational-prestige scores7 and 
break down the variance between rural- and urban-born migrants into components attributable to 
differences in observable characteristics and the remaining unexplained portion of the variance. 
Furthermore, we explore migrants’ job mobility to understand the evolution of their performance 
and opportunities in the urban labor market. We consider within-work-unit and between-work-
unit job changes for both groups and associate them with the changes in the occupational-
prestige scores. 
The main finding of the paper is that the gap in occupational-prestige scores between 
rural migrants and urban migrants becomes very small and statistically insignificant after we 
control for the observed characteristics including gender, educational attainment, family 
background and the occupational-prestige score of premigration jobs.8 This reveals a similar 
                                                 
6. Some researchers have begun to look at the well-being of rural migrants in China. 
Knight and Gunatilaka (2007) found that rural migrants had lower mean happiness despite their 
higher mean income.  The psychological literature has shown that permanent rural migrants are 
not very vulnerable to poor mental health, which might result from a sense of well being 
associated with upward economic mobility and improved opportunities (Li et al., 2007). 
Occupational attainment measured by occupational prestige can to some extent capture fringe, 
welfare, and other benefits of various jobs (Xu, 2000). Therefore, examining occupational 
attainment instead of wages or earnings might also shed light on the well-being of rural migrants. 
7. In particular, we create an index of occupational prestige, ranked by the mean of 
educational attainment in an occupation. This is often used in the job-polarization and wage-
inequality literature to measure job quality. See for example, Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006; 
2008). Refer to the current data section and appendix for further details on the scoring method. 
8. We also compare the regression results using 2002 wages with the results using 2002 
occupational-prestige scores. The results reveal the same conclusion. See table 5.  
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integration speed for both rural and urban migrants with the same predetermined characteristics. 
Although we do not observe any changes in the gap of occupational-prestige scores within the 
first ten years after migration, the job mobility of rural migrants is higher than that of urban 
migrants. We find that rural migrants are more likely to experience job promotions to different 
work units, whereas urban migrants are more likely to be promoted within the same work unit. 
These growth trajectories might be the cause of higher mobility of rural migrants.  
The paper is arranged as follows. The next section summarizes the relevant literature. We 
describe our data in section 3 and our empirical strategies in section 4. Section 5 reports the main 
findings, and section 6 concludes with policy implications. 
 
2. Institutional Background and Relevant Literature 
2.1. A brief overview on hukou and internal migration 
The hukou system in China, which was established in the late 1950s, requires every 
member of the household to register at the local authority of their permanent residence (Chan 
and Buckingham, 2008). For several decades the system place strict limitations on migration, but 
these restrictions were later relaxed in the late 1970s. The dual classification of hukou 
registration is based on both the regular residence and the status (i.e., hukou site and hukou type; 
Chan and Buckingham, 2008; Chan and Zhang, 1999). The type can be either agricultural or 
nonagricultural. Agricultural hukou holders mostly reside in rural areas; therefore, they are also 
known as rural hukou holders. Nonagricultural hukou holders are often called urban hukou 
holders because they mostly reside in urban areas. Very limited state socioeconomic benefits 
were given to the rural hukou population, and the state utilized the hukou system to impose 
significant limits on Chinese citizens’ geographical mobility (Zhao and Liu, 1997). Because 
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hukou was tied to access to food, education, health services, and other basic necessities in the 
system’s early years, it was very rare or even impossible for people to live in a place outside of 
their hukou registration (Fan, 2002a) until the hukou reform in the late 1970s. Rural-to-urban 
status transfer (i.e., changing one’s rural hukou status to urban status; known as nong-zhuan-fei 
in Chinese) entails state approval with various restrictions (Chan and Buckingham, 2008), and 
this process was more difficult to navigate before the late 1970s. As a result, there was very little 
labor mobility during this time.  
 The hukou system was reformed several times over the following decades to help the 
country meet the rapidly increasing labor demand in urban cities due to the economic reforms in 
the late 1970s. On the one hand, the rural-to-urban transfer process was simplified and eased. On 
the other hand, the introduction of national ID cards and temporary residence permits in the mid-
1980s induced a new wave of internal migrants (Fan, 2002a) who no longer need to register their 
hukou to the area where they work or live. These non-hukou migrants are temporary migrants 
without local household registration status.9 In contrast, migrants who transfer their hukou to a 
local authority of the migration destination are called hukou migrants or permanent migrants. 
The growth of rural-to-urban migrants, both temporary and permanent, has been tremendous: the 
number grew from 8.9 million in 1989 (Zhao, 2005) to 79.7 million in 2005 (Gagnon et al., 
2009). Urban-to-urban migrants comprise the second-largest group of internal migrants in China: 
they accounted for 4.5 percent of the total population in 2005 (Gagnon et al., 2009), which is 
only 1.6 percent less than the rural-to-urban migrants. 
2.2. Literature on the occupational attainment of rural migrants 
                                                 
9. This group is also known as the floating population (liu dong ren kou). 
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Most of the existing literature on China’s internal migration has focused on the floating 
population, especially temporary rural-to-urban migrants. These studies usually use local urban 
residents or workers as a comparison group for temporary rural migrants. Researchers have 
focused extensively on the earning differentials between the two groups, including the 
determinants of selection into different occupational sectors. Regardless of data differences 
(Zhao, 2005), these existing studies establish that wage inequality between the two groups is 
mainly due to the low educational attainment among the rural population and low returns to 
education in the rural labor market (Liu, 2005; Lu and Song 2006). Moreover, the unexplained 
wage gap between rural migrants and urban residents might be attributed to the labor market’s 
discrimination in favor of urban hukou holders and against rural migrants (Lu and Song, 2006; 
Meng and Zhang, 2001).10 For example, Meng and Zhang (2001) find that discrimination within 
occupations can explain about 82 percent of the hourly wage differential between urban and rural 
migrant workers.  
Studies on the determinants of selection into different occupational sectors (Meng and 
Zhang, 2001; Demurger et al., 2009; Gagnon et al., 2009) have shown that both education and 
experience play an important role in the occupational segregation between rural migrants and 
urban residents.11 Nonetheless, De Brauw and Giles (2006) point out that many cities have 
reserved some occupational categories for registered urban residents and that there is a 
segregation of rural residents into unskilled service and construction sectors or other relatively 
low-skilled jobs that are unwanted by the urban residents.  
                                                 
10. See also Zhao (2005) for a survey of research papers on rural-urban migration issues 
in China.  
11. For example, Meng and Zhang (2001) find that education increases the probability of 
rural migrants of obtaining a white-collar job. A recent study by Demurger et al. (2009) finds 
that the sectoral difference is not as important as the differences driven by educational attainment. 
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Gagnon et al. (2009) first point out the substantial differences in comparing the rural 
migrants, urban migrants, and urban residents by decomposing the migration effect and hukou 
effect. Using Oaxaca-Blinder’s decomposition, the authors find that 40 percent of the observed 
wage gap between rural and urban migrants might be due to hukou status. They also compare 
urban migrants with urban residents and find a large migration premium. Nevertheless, the 
migrants, in particular the rural migrants, were discriminated against in sector choice compared 
to the urban residents; specifically, formal sectors were less likely to employ rural migrants, 
which excluded them from accessing health and educational services. However, in their study, 
Gagnon et al. (2009) did not consider the permanent rural-to-urban migrants who obtained an 
urban hukou. Therefore, our paper complements Gagnon et al.’s (2009) study by comparing the 
permanent rural migrants with urban migrants to understand the assimilation of rural migrants 
into the urban labor market.  
Another paper that is closely related to ours is Deng and Gustafsson’s (2006) study, 
which is one of the few studies that examines permanent migrants. Combining several household 
surveys, the authors investigate the determinants of permanent migration and the economic 
benefits of migration. To study the economic assimilation of permanent rural migrants, they 
compare them with local-born urban workers as does most of the other literature. They run 
regressions on earnings and control for observed characteristics such as gender, marital status, 
age, and ethnicity. For rural migrants, they also control for the years since receiving an urban 
hukou. Their results show that the permanent rural migrants who received their urban hukou 
before age 25 are well integrated economically in their place of destination. Overall, they 
actually receive higher earnings than the local-born urban residents.  
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Though the sample size of our data is smaller than Deng and Gustafsson’s (2006), its 
retrospective information enables us to examine the job trajectories of the permanent migrants. 
Another difference between the current paper and Deng and Gustafsson’s (2006) study is that we 
limit our sample to those who migrated in the 1980s or later in order to exclude positively 
selected rural migrants who migrated for special policy reasons.12 
Few studies show empirical evidence on the job mobility of rural migrants. Though the 
reform of state-owned enterprises in the late 1980s has increased the mobility of urban workers, 
rural migrants have remained more mobile even after controlling for their demographic 
characteristics (Knight and Yueh, 2004). On the contrary, Zhang (2010) argues that temporary 
migrants have longer job durations than local urban workers and only start to change jobs more 
often after they have stayed in their destination city for some time. However, due to data 
limitations, Zhang (2010) was not able to distinguish between temporary urban migrants and 
temporary rural migrants.  
We find that the permanent rural migrants tend to have higher mobility than permanent 
urban migrants. In this sense, the current paper complements the study by Knight and Yueh 
(2004), which compares temporary rural migrants with local residents and finds a higher 
turnover rate for the former group. Moreover, we distinguish between internal job mobility (i.e., 
within-work-unit job changes and promotions) and external job mobility (i.e., between-work-unit 
job changes and promotions) and discuss the variations and potential implications for rural and 
urban migrants.  
                                                 
12. For example, job transfer is a typical reason for state-planned migration before the 
hukou reform period; in this process, highly educated rural workers are selected for urban 
government jobs (Chan and Buckingham, 2008). Consequently, permanent migrants in Deng and 
Gustafsson’s (2006) study are more educated than the permanent migrants in our sample and 
might be subject to positive selection bias.   
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3. Data  
The data used in this paper come from the CGSS (2003). The 2003 CGSS contains 5,900 
urban households in more than 100 counties and districts in 26 provinces, as well as the cities of 
Beijing and Chongqing and four independently administered municipal districts.13 Besides 
demographic information such as age, sex, education, family background, and household 
registration status (i.e., hukou), the CGSS 2003 provides each respondent's employment history 
from the first to the current job. The data include details on the nature of employment, including 
three-digit occupation codes, management level, professional title, work-unit type, rank of the 
departmental supervisor for the work unit, job-related housing and medical benefits, and so forth.  
Our main dependent variable is the occupational-prestige score. It is the z-score of the 
average educational attainment of workers within each occupation normalized by the average 
educational attainment of all workers in the sample.14 A more detailed process is described in the 
appendix. Although our main analysis is based on the occupational-prestige score, we also 
examine job mobility. We exploit rich information on work units and job ranks to capture 
                                                 
13. The CGSS (2003) is conducted jointly by the HKUST’s Survey Research Center and 
the the Sociology Department of People’s University of China. The initial survey design uses a 
four-stage stratified sampling scheme with unequal probabilities. In the first stage, a total of 
2,801 county- and district-level units in China are broken into five major strata: (1) the city 
districts of Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai; (2) the city districts of provincial capital-level cities; 
(3) the eastern region; (4) the central region; and (5) the western region. From each stratum, a 
predetermined number of city districts and rural counties are chosen as the primary sampling 
units (PSUs). At the end, 125 PSUs are chosen, and in each sampled PSU, 4 districts and 
townships are selected. From each of these districts and townships, 2 neighborhood committees 
or villager committees are selected, and finally, 10 households are sampled from each sampled 
committee. The final sampling result would have included 5,900 urban households and 4,100 
rural households; however, only the urban sample was published. Therefore, our analysis is 
limited to the 5,900 households that were located in urban PSUs at the time of survey in 2003.  
14. As a robustness check, we examine the z-scores of the residuals from regressing the 
years of education on a polynomial function of birth year to remove the potential bias of prestige 
score due to education variations of different birth cohorts (see the appendix for more detail). 
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upward job moves that are independent of occupational changes. Specifically, we count the 
number of job changes, both including and excluding job reassignment within the same work 
unit, and moves to better jobs in terms of the characteristics of the work units and job ranks. The 
construction is also described in the appendix. In addition, we use personal income in 2002 as 
another supplemental variable to capture the gaps between urban and rural migrants that are not 
reflected by the occupational-prestige score.  
We constructed a panel dataset from the retrospective information on hukou status 
changes, migration, education, and job histories. We set the time window as the period from 
1979 to 2003 to exclude migrations due to special policy reasons such as “up to the mountain, 
down to the village.”15 We further limit our sample to rural-to-urban migrants (hereafter, rural 
migrants) and urban-to-urban migrants (hereafter, urban migrants). Rural migrants are migrants 
from a rural area who reported that they had a rural hukou when they were born.16 Urban 
migrants are migrants from an urban area17 who were born with an urban hukou. Lastly, we 
restrict our sample to those who have valid information for all variables included in the 
regression analysis. Such variables include educational background, parental information, and 
jobs held in the year prior to the migration. Consequently, this limits our sample to those who 
had a job both before and after migration. Details are presented in the appendix (table 1, panel A).  
 The final sample consists of 433 urban-to-urban migration spells and 208 rural-to-urban 
migration spells. Panel A of table 1 illustrates summary statistics of these two groups. Although 
                                                 
15. Please refer to Appendix (page 41) for the meaning of the phrase “up to the mountain, 
down to the village”. 
16. More precise, rural migrants are migrants who reported a rural-to-urban hukou 
transfer (nong-zhuan-fei) and who were holding an urban hukou in the year of 2003.   
17. Towns, urban counties, prefecture-level cities (di ji shi), provincial capitals, and the 
municipalities directly under the central government (zhixiashi). 
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only one rural migrant experienced rural-to-urban migration twice, a nonnegligible fraction of 
urban migrants migrated more than once. The t-test shows that differences between the two 
groups are statistically significant in all demographic variables except for the year of migration 
and percentage of female. On average, the rural migrants in the sample are less educated than the 
urban migrants; specifically, about 65 percent of the rural migrants are at or below the middle 
school level, whereas about 60 percent of the urban migrants are at the high school level or 
above.18 Also, the parents of rural migrants are less educated than those of urban migrants. The 
occupations of the rural migrants’ fathers were less prestigious than those of urban migrants. 
Furthermore, the rural migrants themselves held less prestigious jobs prior to migration than the 
urban migrants. These variables indicate that the rural migrants have a lower socioeconomic 
background than the urban migrants.  
It is worth noting that our sample of rural migrants is, on average, more educated than the 
general population of China. According to the 1-percent sample survey of the Chinese population 
in 2000, the educational distribution of the population aged 50 to 54 (the cohort that corresponds 
to the mean and majority of our sample), was as follows: 13.7 percent no schooling, 43.14 
percent primary school, 30.38 percent middle school, 9.15 percent senior high school, 2.71 
percent associate’s degree; 0.86 percent university, 0.05 percent graduate students. This is 
probably because there is a large percentage of rural population in China, who are generally less 
educated. At the same time, our sample is less educated than the data used by Deng and 
Gustafsson (2006).19 Because their sample is much older than ours, it is likely to include 
                                                 
18. This ratio is even higher than that of urban residents who have never migrated, which 
is about 50 percent. 
19. Deng and Gustafsson’s (2006) sample has an average of eleven years of schooling, 
and the percentage of each educational level for rural migrants is 8 percent primary school or 
below, 26 percent middle school, 35 percent high school, and 32 percent college or higher. The 
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individuals who had migrated to cities before the hukou relaxation policy. However, older 
samples may create a selection bias because early hukou policy was so strict that only highly 
skilled and highly educated individuals tended to migrate, usually in response to government 
efforts to relocate personnel. We limit our data to individuals who migrated in the 1980s or later 
to avoid this potential selection bias. 
Panel B of table 1 presents the occupational-prestige scores in each year since migration. 
The negative scores (measured by the normalized mean education level) for rural migrants reveal 
that rural migrants are taking less prestigious jobs; specifically, their occupational-prestige scores 
are lower than the general population’s average by around 26 to 33 percent of one standard 
deviation. The sample’s urban migrants tend to take jobs with relatively high prestige—about 13 
percent to 18 percent of one standard deviation higher than the population average. The table 
also shows little variation over time in the average occupational-prestige scores in the first ten 
years after migration for both rural and urban migrants. 
Panel C of table 1 presents the number of job changes and upward moves within and 
across work units. A sizeable proportion of rural and urban migrants changed jobs and work 
units within the first ten years after their migration. In the sample, the rural migrants are more 
mobile than urban migrants. Moreover, rural migrants are more likely to move to a better job in a 
different work unit than urban migrants. Finally, the average personal income in 2002 was 
14,403 Yuan for urban migrants and 10,952 Yuan for rural migrants.  
                                                                                                                                                             
corresponding figures for the urban-born sample are 4 percent, 27 percent, 43 percent, and 26 
percent, respectively. 
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Before carrying out the main analysis on the labor-market performance of the rural 
migrants and urban migrants, we compare their occupational-prestige scores with those of local 
urban residents of the same age and gender.20 
Figure 1 illustrates how the difference in the occupational-prestige score from local urban 
residents evolves over time for rural and urban migrants.21 We control for age, age-squared, and 
gender, and thus the graph represents the differences between migrants and local residents with 
the same age and gender. We see that the urban migrants are likely to hold jobs with more 
occupational prestige than the local urban residents, especially in the first few years after 
migration. This may be due to the fact that urban migrants have a higher education than urban 
residents who have never migrated.22 Other studies also find that urban migrants have a higher 
income level despite the limited choices of work sectors compared to the local residents (Gagnon 
et al., 2009). As expected, rural migrants hold jobs with much lower occupational prestige than 
                                                 
20. Ideally, we would like to compare the score between migrants and local residents in 
the same geographical area. However, the dataset does not contain such information. 
21. The estimation equation is
10 10
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k k k k
it it i it i it
k k
Y D U D R   
 
      itθ'X , where k = 
1,2, …9, Dkit takes a value of 1 if year t is kth year after migration for migrant i. D10it takes a value 
of 1 if ten or more years have passed since migration as of year t. Ui is a dummy for urban 
migrants, Ri is a dummy for rural migrants. X is a vector of control variables including age, age 
squared, and gender. γk is the gap between rural migrants and native-born urban residents in the 
kth year after migration. δk is the gap between urban migrants and native-born urban residents in 
the kth year after migration. 
22. Among the sample of CGSS, about 20 percent of urban residents who have never 
migrated since the 1978 have primary school or less education, while only 9 percent of the urban 
migrants do. The proportion of those who have high school or more education is about 50 
percent for urban non-migrants and 60 percent for urban migrants. This difference is not 
attributable to the differences in generation because the average age is similar between the two 
groups. Furthermore, the composition of educational background of our sample looks similar to 
Gagnon et. al (2009)’s data corrected in 2005:  Urban migrants: 26 percent college+ ; 36 percent 
high school; 32 percent middle school; 6 percent primary school; Urban residents: 22 percent 
college+; 31 percent high school; 37 percent middle school; 10 percent primary school. 
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the local urban residents. Section 5 investigates how much of this gap can be explained by 
differences in observed human capital such as education and premigration job experience.  
 
4. Empirical Model 
            To measure the gap between urban and rural migrants, we estimate the following 
regression:23 
it i itY R     itθ'X ,                 (1) 
where yit represents the occupational-prestige score for individual i in year t, and Ri is a dummy 
variable for rural migrant. Xit is a vector of control variables, to which we add variables gradually. 
εit represents the remaining error, which can be correlated within an individual. We cluster our 
standard errors by the individual.    
We begin by including only age, age-squared, and sex in Xit to examine the gap between 
urban and rural migrants without controlling for any differences in skill level. Then we add the 
migrant’s own educational background and observe how β changes. Our hypothesis is that 
controlling for educational qualification will reduce the gap between the two types of migrants. 
To explore the role of family background in explaining the gap in the outcome variable, we add 
parents’ years of schooling and father’s occupational-prestige score from the year when the 
migrant was 18 years old. Lastly, we add the occupational-prestige score of the last job prior to 
migration as a proxy for job experience accumulated before migration.  
                                                 
23. Note that we estimate simple repeated ordinary least squares regressions even though 
we have panel data because more than half of the migrants have migrated only once.  
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     In order to allow β and θ to vary with years after migration, we estimate equation (1) 
separately for those in the first to third year after migration, the fourth to sixth year, and the 
seventh to ninth year.  
Furthermore, to explore the change of β year by year, we estimate the following 
regression: 
9 9
2 2
k k k k
it i it it i it
k k
Y R D D R    
 
       itθ'X ,              (2) 
and plot the gap in each year subsequent to migration. Dkit is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if year t is the kth year after migration for migrant i. β+γk is the gap between rural and 
urban migrants in the kth year after migration for k ≥ 2, and β is the gap for k = 1. As an 
additional test, we estimate equations (1) and (2) separately for migrants with different 
educational levels.  
We further explore the job mobility of rural migrants compared to urban migrants by 
estimating an equation similar to equation (1), except that the sample is collapsed into the person 
level instead of the person-year level:  
'i i i iY R X                          (3) 
The dependent variable Y represents the following four measures of job mobility, all measured 
in the first ten years after migration: (a) number of job changes, including job transfer within a 
work unit; (b) number of work unit changes; (c) number of within-work-unit job promotions; and 
(d) number of upward moves across work units.  
        Finally, we examine the gap in personal income in 2002 between urban and rural 
migrants. The equation we estimate is the same as equation (3), except that the dependent 
variable is personal income in 2002 and the sample is limited to those who had a nonzero income 
in 2002.  
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5. Findings  
5.1. Occupational Prestige Score 
Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients of the dummy for rural migrants in equation 
(1). Column 1 includes age, age-squared, and sex in the covariates. Column 2 adds education 
dummies. Column 3 adds parent’s education and father’s occupational-prestige score. Column 4 
adds the occupational-prestige score of the premigration job. Each row corresponds to a separate 
regression with a subsample divided by years since migration. First, we see that adding controls 
for education substantially narrowed the gap in occupational-prestige scores between rural and 
urban migrants. For example, in the first three years after migration, the gap is as large as 45 
percent of one standard deviation of the scores in the population when holding only age and 
gender constant, but the gap shrinks to 23 percent when controlling for education. On the other 
hand, controlling for parental background does not seem to narrow the gap after we control for 
age, gender and education differences. Rural migrants still hold less prestigious jobs than urban 
migrants, and the difference is statistically significant.   
          However, with controls for the occupational-prestige score of the last premigration job, the 
gap in postmigration occupational prestige between rural and urban migrants is no longer 
statistically significant. This finding implies that the observed gaps between rural and urban 
migrants are likely to be attributed to the differences in their human-capital accumulation prior to 
migration rather than some sort of discrimination against rural-born migrants who otherwise 
have the same human capital as their urban-born counterparts.     
Figure 2 plots the estimated gap between rural and urban migrants in each year after 
migration from equation (2). The results confirm the observations from table 2. Furthermore, the 
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changes in the occupational-attainment gap between these two groups does not seem to change 
over time in all specifications. This stability of the gap over time suggests that something that 
determines the labor-market outcomes at the time of migration (in this case, the occupational-
prestige score) continues to influence the occupational attainment of rural and urban migrants 
over their lifecycles. Such determinants also likely include educational attainment and job 
experience before migration because the gap between the two groups shrinks substantially after 
controlling for these variables.  
So, does the gap vary by the educational qualification of the migrants? We run the 
regression separately for each educational level. Table 3 (panels A-D) and figures 3A-D show 
the gaps in occupational-prestige scores between rural and urban migrants for four subgroups 
categorized by educational background. Like table 2 and figure 2, we gradually add explanatory 
variables such as parental characteristics and the occupational-prestige score of premigration 
jobs. Except for those with post high-school education, rural migrants are taking up jobs with a 
lower prestige score than urban migrants. Yet, after controlling for the occupational-prestige 
score of premigration jobs, the gaps are no longer statistically significant, except for the least 
educated group.   
In contrast, the gap is positive for migrants with more than a high school education. This 
means that the rural migrants with more than a high school education hold jobs with more 
occupational prestige than urban migrants with the same level of education. Furthermore, the gap 
has an upward slope, which suggests that the highly educated rural migrants do better the longer 
they stay in the urban labor market. Panel D of table 3 shows that the effect is substantial in size: 
being a rural migrant is associated with a higher occupational-prestige score (about 30 percent of 
one standard deviation higher), holding other observed characteristics constant.  
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It is interesting to note that the level of the gap is smaller for middle school graduates 
than that for high school graduates. The evidence is consistent with the argument by De Brauw 
and Giles (2006) that the career prospects of high-school graduates in rural areas might not be 
better (or might even be worse) than rural individuals with less education.  
 We also explore the gap by migration destination. The results are presented in appendix 
table 4, panel A. We do not observe statistically significant differences for those who migrated 
into small towns; however, the gap between rural migrants and urban migrants remains negative 
for those who migrated into counties and other large cities (without controlling for the 
occupational-prestige score of the premigration job). The gap gradually reduces along with the 
length of stay in large cities (panel C). The gap decreases even further and becomes positive for 
migrants who moved to large cities once we control for the premigration occupational-prestige 
score, although these trends are not statistically significant. 
 
5.2  Job Mobility 
As already indicated by panel C in table 1, rural migrants tend to change jobs more 
frequently than urban migrants. To examine whether such differences in job mobility can also be 
attributed to the differences in observed characteristics, we estimate equation (3) with the 
following dependent variables: number of job changes, including job transfer within a work-unit; 
number of work-unit changes; number of within-work-unit job promotions; and number of 
upward moves between work-units. Because we define an upward change on the basis of work-
unit type and job rank, the concept can capture some features associated with the job that are not 
reflected in the occupational-prestige score. Table 4 presents the estimated coefficients of the 
dummy variable for rural migrants.  
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The first two rows show that rural migrants are more mobile than urban migrants, even 
after controlling for the occupational-prestige score of premigration jobs. This may be because, 
as Li (2008) argues, many rural migrants cannot afford to be unemployed for a long time. 
Another potential cause of the high mobility of rural migrants is their concentration in highly 
competitive, unskilled occupations. 
The third row shows negative coefficients of the rural-migrants dummy variable. In 
particular, the findings reveal that rural migrants are less likely than urban migrants to be 
promoted within work-units, although the estimates are not statistically significant. In contrast, 
the fourth row shows that rural migrants are more likely to move to better jobs between work-
units.   
 It is true that a part of this difference is spurious because rural migrants are more likely 
to move in general.24  However, this potential spurious difference cannot explain all of the 
variation in the finding. A back-of-envelope calculation of the data (shown in panel C of table 1 
suggests that the probability of a between-unit job change being an upward move is 18 percent 
for rural migrants but just 10 percent for urban migrants. Table 4 suggests that these differences 
are not likely to be attributed to the observed characteristics included in the fourth column. One 
possible explanation comes from Li (2008)’s argument that rural migrants lack the full 
information about the nature of their jobs and that rural migrants’ first job in an urban labor 
market serve as a pilot for them to progress and find a better job (with higher pay) later.  
  
5.3 Income in 2002 
                                                 
24. Knight and Yueh (2006) find that temporary rural migrants are much more mobile 
than local urban workers. However, Zhang (2010) claims that temporary rural migrants are less 
mobile because they are discriminated against in the labor market. Unfortunately, neither study 
examines permanent rural migrants. 
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Finally, we estimate the differences in personal income in 2002 between urban and rural 
migrants. The results for personal income (table 5) are consistent with the basic observations 
from the occupational-prestige scores (table 2): the gap becomes smaller and statistically 
insignificant when we add the prestige score of premigration jobs and other explanatory 
variables.   
 
6. Concluding Remarks  
China’s internal migration has been growing rapidly with the country’s economic 
development in recent years. A substantial amount of research has been conducted on the labor-
market performance of temporary migrants, especially temporary rural-to-urban migrants. 
However, very little empirical work has examined permanent rural migrants, who eventually 
transferred their rural hukou status to an urban status. Moreover, most of the earlier studies on 
rural migrants have compared them with urban local residents, who are generally in a segmented 
labor market due to factors such as local labor-protection policies.  
We utilize the retrospective information on employment and migration from the 2003 
China General Social Survey to analyze the labor market performance of permanent rural 
migrants and permanent urban migrants. We measure the occupational attainment by an 
education-based index that reflects occupational prestige. Furthermore, we explore job mobility 
within and between work-units.  
Our results suggest that the observed inequality between permanent rural and urban 
migrants in occupational attainment can be attributed to differences in characteristics 
predetermined by the time of migration. In fact, after controlling for characteristics of one’s 
premigration job, the gap between rural and urban migrants is no longer statistically significant, 
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and in some cases the effect even becomes positive (although not significant). Therefore, 
encouraging human-capital investment in rural areas could be an effective policy intervention to 
lessen the economic disparities between rural-born permanent migrants and their urban-born 
peers (Lu and Song, 2006). 
Even though the analysis on the occupational-prestige score reveals a similar integration 
speed for rural and urban migrants in the labor market, we find that rural migrants experience 
higher job mobility. Rural migrants are more likely to move upward in a state-owned sector, 
obtaining more job autonomy (e.g., increased supervisory role at the job) or receiving more 
medical and housing benefits. However, rural migrants tend to have fewer opportunities than 
urban migrants for job promotion within work units, although the finding is not statistically 
significant. Although we cannot pin down where this difference comes from, it is plausible that 
rural migrants try to achieve better job outcomes through continued efforts to seek opportunities 
outside of their current workplace.  
Our findings might indicate that, in addition to the the vast differences in earnings 
opportunities between rural and urban areas, rural migrants might be attracted to cities because 
even relatively less prestigious jobs in cities provides better occupational attainment than many 
jobs available in rural areas. This suggests that, by creating more employment opportunities 
outside of farming in rural areas, China can possibly slow down the inflow of rural migrants into 
cities and mitigate social problems associated with this excessively rapid migration.    
Finally, China is quickly granting more permanent hukou residency to rural migrants (Xie, 
2010). The hukou relaxation policy intends to settle most members of the floating population in 
the cities after the removal of the hurdles created by the hukou system (Zhu, 2007). On the one 
hand, a better understanding of permanent rural migrants and their occupational attainment will 
 23
shed light on how hukou policy might affect the labor-market performance of the floating 
population. On the other hand, permanent urban migrants also constitute a large proportion of the 
internal migrants in China (Gagnon et al., 2009). Future research on internal migration in China 
would do well to provide more understanding of these “less well-known” migrants.  
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics  
A. Predetermined characteristics 
 Urban Migrants Rural Migrants  
Sample size 433 208  
 1st migration 375 207  
 2nd migration 52 1  
 3rd migration 6 0  
Mean of explanatory variables t-test stat 
Year of migration 1989.3 1989.5 0.29 
Age at the time of migration 32.2 30.7 -2.18** 
% Female 52.9% 53.8% 0.23 
Years of schooling  11.5 9.6 -7.42*** 
 % primary school or less 9.0% 27.9%  
 % middle school 30.9% 37.0%  
 % high school 27.0% 22.1%  
 % more than high school education 33.0% 13.0%  
Father’s years of schooling 7.5 4.8 -7.1*** 
Mother’s years of schooling 4.5 2.4 -6.38*** 
Occupational-prestige score of father’s job in 
the year when the respondent was 18 -0.10 -1.29 -13.9*** 
Occupational-prestige score of the job held 
in the year prior to migration 0.12 -0.60 -8.77*** 
 
B. Occupational-prestige score by years since migration  
Year since 
migration 
Urban migrants Rural migrants 
mean sd n mean sd n 
1 0.18 0.69 417 -0.31 0.83 189 
2 0.15 0.69 399 -0.32 0.82 179 
3 0.15 0.70 374 -0.28 0.82 179 
4 0.14 0.68 345 -0.27 0.81 171 
5 0.16 0.69 327 -0.29 0.81 158 
6 0.17 0.70 305 -0.31 0.80 148 
7 0.16 0.71 280 -0.30 0.81 137 
8 0.17 0.69 258 -0.31 0.83 132 
9 0.16 0.70 232 -0.28 0.83 123 
10 0.13 0.70 215 -0.33 0.82 118 
 
C. Job mobility in the first 10 year after migration  
Number of observations: urban migrants 256, rural migrants 141  
 Number of job changes 
Number of work unit 
changes 
Number of within 
unit promotion 
Number of across 
unit upward move
# of changes urban rural urban rural urban rural urban rural 
0 55.9% 38.3% 84.0% 63.8% 92.6% 95.7% 98.1% 91.5%
1 35.6% 42.6% 14.1% 29.1% 5.5% 3.6% 2.0% 8.5% 
2 6.3% 12.8% 1.6% 5.0% 2.0% 0.7%   
3 2.0% 5.0% 0.4% 2.1%     
4 0.0% 1.4%       
6 0.4% 0.0%       
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D. Income in 2002 
 
 Urban migrants Rural migrants total 
Income in 2002 (yuan) 14403.2 10952.0 13224.5
Log income 9.24 8.86 9.11 
 
 
 
Table 2. Gaps in the Occupational-Prestige Score between Rural-to-Urban and Urban-to-Urban 
Migrants 
Coefficients of the rural-migrant dummy variable 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Control variables: 
 
Sample : 
Age and sex 
only 
(1) plus own 
education 
(2) plus 
parents' 
education and 
occupation 
(3) plus the 
prestige score 
of the 
premigration 
job 
1-3 years after migration -0.449*** -0.235*** -0.223*** -0.005 
(sample size: 1,737) [0.070] [0.066] [0.069] [0.054] 
4-6 years after migration -0.427*** -0.220*** -0.197*** -0.009 
(sample size: 1,454) [0.075] [0.069] [0.075] [0.066] 
7-9 years after migration -0.435*** -0.217*** -0.196** -0.025 
(sample size: 1,162) [0.082] [0.073] [0.079] [0.072] 
 
Note: OLS regression with repeated observations from the same individuals. Standard errors are in 
brackets and are clustered by individual ID.  
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Table 3. Gaps in the Occupational-Prestige Score between Rural-to-Urban and Urban-to-Urban 
Migrants, by Education  
 
A. Primary school or less  
Coefficients of the rural-migrant dummy variable 
    (1) (2) (3) 
Control variables: 
 
Sample : 
Age, sex, and 
primary school 
dummy 
(1) plus parents' 
education and 
occupation 
(2) plus the prestige 
score of the 
premigration job 
1-3 years after migration -0.610*** -0.549*** -0.269 
(sample size: 265) [0.139] [0.168] [0.169] 
4-6 years after migration -0.611*** -0.534*** -0.372* 
(sample size: 220) [0.147] [0.189] [0.203] 
7-9 years after migration -0.568*** -0.493** -0.341 
(sample size: 189) [0.169] [0.204] [0.233] 
 
 
B. Middle school  
Coefficients of the rural-migrant dummy variable 
    (1) (2) (3) 
Control variables: 
 
Sample : 
Age and sex  
(1) plus parents' 
education and 
occupation 
(2) plus the prestige 
score of the 
premigration job 
1-3 years after migration -0.193* -0.105 0.071 
(sample size: 571) [0.110] [0.110] [0.081] 
4-6 years after migration -0.195 -0.116 0.037 
(sample size: 457) [0.126] [0.128] [0.103] 
7-9 years after migration -0.254** -0.222* -0.053 
(sample size: 359) [0.124] [0.126] [0.099] 
 
 
C. High school  
Coefficients of the rural-migrant dummy variable 
    (1) (2) (3) 
Control variables: 
 
Sample : 
Age and sex  
(1) plus parents' 
education and 
occupation 
(2) plus the prestige 
score of the 
premigration job 
1-3 years after migration -0.295** -0.299** -0.122 
(sample size: 435) [0.128] [0.145] [0.123] 
4-6 years after migration -0.277** -0.225 -0.101 
(sample size: 361) [0.131] [0.143] [0.151] 
7-9 years after migration -0.257* -0.244 -0.157 
(sample size: 275) [0.150] [0.168] [0.185] 
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D. Post high school education  
Coefficients of the rural-migrant dummy variable 
    (1) (2) (3) 
Control variables: 
 
Sample : 
Age, sex, and 
dummies for 
educational 
attainment  
(1) plus parents' 
education and 
occupation 
(2) plus the prestige 
score of the 
premigration job 
1-3 years after migration 0.173 0.13 0.232* 
(sample size: 466) [0.136] [0.140] [0.123] 
4-6 years after migration 0.173 0.131 0.321*** 
(sample size: 416) [0.126] [0.138] [0.121] 
7-9 years after migration 0.251* 0.231 0.406*** 
(sample size: 339) [0.134] [0.149] [0.133] 
 
Note: OLS regression with repeated observations of the same individuals. Standard errors are in 
brackets and are clustered by individual ID.  
 
 
Table 4.  Gaps in Job Mobility in the First 10 Years after Migration between Rural-to-Urban 
and Urban-to-Urban Migrants  
Coefficients of the rural-migrant dummy variable; sample size = 397 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Control variables: 
 
Dependent  
variables : 
Age and 
sex only
(1) plus own 
education
(2) plus parents' 
education and 
occupation 
(3) plus the prestige 
score of the 
premigration job
Number of job changes 0.401*** 0.320*** 0.380*** 0.332*** 
 [0.105] [0.100] [0.097] [0.091] 
Number of work-unit changes 0.257*** 0.243*** 0.274*** 0.263*** 
 [0.076] [0.073] [0.067] [0.065] 
Number of within-unit promotions -0.027 -0.031 -0.033 -0.049 
 [0.028] [0.028] [0.032] [0.030] 
Number of between-unit upward moves 0.055** 0.052* 0.068*** 0.066*** 
 [0.027] [0.027] [0.025] [0.025] 
Note: OLS regression with repeated observations of the same individuals. Standard errors are in 
brackets and are clustered by individual ID.  
 
 
Table 5.  Gaps in income in 2002 between Rural-to-Urban and Urban-to-urban Migrants  
Coefficients of the rural-migrant dummy variable 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Control variables: 
 
Sample: 
Age and 
sex only
(1) plus own 
education
(2) plus parents' 
education and 
occupation 
(3) plus the prestige 
score of the 
premigration job
All migrants in the sample -0.224** -0.224** -0.173* -0.113 
(sample size: 350) [0.088] [0.088] [0.100] [0.101] 
Year of migration ≥1993 -0.071 -0.071 -0.023 -0.017 
(sample size: 160) [0.141] [0.141] [0.150] [0.154] 
Year of migration <1993 -0.273** -0.273** -0.235 -0.14 
(sample size: 190) [0.124] [0.124] [0.142] [0.138] 
Note: OLS regression with repeated observations of the same individuals. Standard errors are in 
brackets and are clustered by individual ID.  
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Table A1. Sample selection 
(Based on person, not migration spells) 
 Remaining Dropped 
 Urban-to-urbanRural-to-urbanUrban-to-Urban Rural-to-urban
Original CGSS 2003  5894   
Inconsistent education or job history 5,845 49 
Migrants only  1,070 1,117 3658 
Have valid job information (i.e., dependent var) 759 668 311 449 
Have valid parental information 654 611 105 57 
Have premigration job information 374 207 280 404 
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Table A2. Reasons for Migration, by Rural and Urban status, Education, and Year of Migration (%) 
 
 Urban migrants by education By year of migration Urban 
 Primary or less 
Middle  
school 
High  
school More ~1983
1984-
1991 
1992-
1996 
1997-
2003 Total 
Attending school 0.0 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.0 0.6 0.0 2.2 0.7 
Joining the Army 2.6 3.8 1.7 3.5 5.8 1.3 2.1 4.3 3.0 
Worker-to-cadre transfer (Zhuan Gan) 2.6 3.0 2.6 2.8 5.8 2.6 1.1 2.2 2.8 
Other employment-related reasons  43.6 36.4 31.6 42.7 38.4 37.6 49.5 25.8 37.8 
Migrated with the family 28.2 28.0 37.6 21.0 27.9 30.6 26.3 26.9 28.3 
Political reasons (Zhi nei /Zhi bian, Shang Shan Xia Xiang) 2.6 2.3 0.9 0.0 2.3 0.6 2.1 0.0 1.2 
Residential changes, other reasons 20.5 23.5 24.8 28.0 18.6 26.1 18.9 35.5 25.1 
 Rural migrants by education By year of migration Rural 
 Primary or less 
Middle  
school 
High  
school More ~1983
1984-
1991 
1992-
1996 
1997-
2003 total 
Attending school 0.0 1.3 6.5 11.1 5.0 4.2 0.0 4.2 3.4 
Joining the Army 1.7 3.9 2.2 0.0 2.5 5.6 0.0 0.0 2.4 
Worker-to-cadre transfer (Zhuan Gan) 0.0 3.9 10.9 11.1 0.0 5.6 8.2 6.3 5.3 
Other employment-related reasons  36.2 22.1 39.1 48.1 40.0 36.6 36.7 18.8 33.2 
Migrated with the family 39.7 31.2 19.6 11.1 25.0 19.7 26.5 45.8 28.4 
Purchase (self-purchase of local urban hukou, houses with hukou quota) 5.2 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8 10.2 0.0 3.4 
Policies related to urban development 13.8 18.2 17.4 3.7 5.0 18.3 10.2 22.9 14.9 
Political reasons (Zhi nei /Zhi bian, Shang Shan Xia Xiang) 1.7 7.8 2.2 7.4 17.5 4.2 0.0 0.0 4.8 
Residential changes, other reasons 1.7 6.5 2.2 7.4 5.0 2.8 8.2 2.1 4.3 
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Table A3. Distribution of Educational Background, by Rural and Urban status and Year of 
Migration 
 
A. Urban Migrants 
 1979-1983 1984-1991 1992-1996 1997-2003 Total 
All urban migrants 
including those 
dropped due to 
missing variables
Primary school or less 20.9 10.8 3.2 1.1 9.1 15.7 
Middle school 34.9 31.9 33.7 21.5 30.6 28.5 
High school 20.9 28.7 26.3 31.2 27.2 28.2 
More 23.3 28.7 36.8 46.2 33.2 27.6 
 
B. Rural Migrants 
 1979-1983 1984-1991 1992-1996 1997-2003 Total 
All rural migrants 
including those 
dropped due to 
missing variables
Primary school or less 35.0 29.6 22.5 25.0 27.9 32.1 
Middle school 40.0 33.8 40.8 35.4 37.0 37.1 
High school 17.5 23.9 20.4 25.0 22.1 25.0 
More 7.5 12.7 16.3 14.6 13.0 5.8 
 
Table A4. Gaps in the Occupational Prestige Score between Rural-to-Urban and Urban-to-
Urban Migrants, by Migration Destination  
     
Panel A: Small Town     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Control variables: Age only 
(1) plus own 
education 
(2) plus parents' 
education and 
occupation 
(3) plus the 
prestige score of 
the premigration 
job 
1-3 years after migration 0.211 0.107 -0.047 -0.141 
(sample size: 826) [0.153] [0.207] [0.196] [0.198] 
4-6 years after migration 0.149 -0.052 -0.102 -0.228
(sample size: 703) [0.207] [0.255] [0.215] [0.218] 
7-9 years after migration 0.082 -0.005 -0.075 -0.168 
(sample size: 581) [0.212] [0.254] [0.207] [0.225] 
     
Panel B: County   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Control variables: Age only 
(1) plus own 
education 
(2) plus parents' 
education and 
occupation 
(3) plus the 
prestige score of 
the premigration 
job 
1-3 years after migration -0.524*** -0.183 -0.541*** -0.12 
(sample size: 321) [0.151] [0.152] [0.185] [0.112] 
4-6 years after migration -0.612*** -0.092 -0.672*** -0.295 
(sample size: 249) [0.168] [0.176] [0.219] [0.178] 
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7-9 years after migration -0.588*** -0.085 -0.574** -0.14 
(sample size: 201) [0.168] [0.146] [0.227] [0.162] 
     
Panel C: Other large cities     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Control variables: Age only 
(1) plus own 
education 
(2) plus parents' 
education and 
occupation 
(3) plus the 
prestige score of 
the premigration 
job 
1-3 years after migration -0.459*** -0.289*** -0.333*** 0.044 
(sample size:1229) [0.086] [0.080] [0.094] [0.080] 
4-6 years after migration -0.396*** -0.247*** -0.228** 0.095 
(sample size:1054) [0.091] [0.081] [0.097] [0.091] 
7-9 years after migration -0.405*** -0.235*** -0.231** 0.108 
(sample size: 831) [0.099] [0.087] [0.110] [0.109] 
Note: OLS regression with repeated observations of the same individuals. Standard errors are in 
brackets and are clustered by individual ID.  
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Figure 1: Differences in Occupation Prestige Score from Local-born Workers
Urban migrants Rural migrants 
Notes: 
 (a)Y-axis represents the gap of occupational-prestige scores between migrants and local urban 
residents. X-axis represents the years since migration.  
(b) The independent variables included are age, age-squared, and a dummy variable for female.  
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Figure 2: Changes in the Occupational-Prestige-Score Gaps between 
Rural-to-Urban and Urban-to-Urban Migrants over Time
(1) age and sex only (2) (1) + own education
(3) (2) + parents' characteristics (4) (3) + premigration job
 
(a)Y-axis is the gap in occupational-prestige scores between rural-to-urban and urban-to-urban 
migrants. X-axis represents the length of the migration spell.  
(b) Model 1 includes age, age-squared, and a dummy variable for female in the RHS; model 2 builds 
on model 1 by adding dummies for the level of education. Model 3 adds father's education, mother's 
education, and an occupational-prestige score for father's occupation. Model 4 adds the occupational-
prestige score of the respondent's premigration job.  
(c) The sample is limited to those with all nonmissing information in the full models.  
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Figure 3A: Changes in the Occupational-Prestige-Score Gaps between 
Rural-to-Urban and Urban-to-Urban Migrants over Time, Primary School and 
Below
(3) (2) +premigration job age and sex only (2) (1) + parents' characteristics (1) age and sex only
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Figure 3B: Changes in the Occupational-Prestige-Score Gaps between 
Rural-to-Urban and Urban-to-Urban Migrants over Time, Middle School
(3) (2) +premigration job age and sex only (2) (1) + parents' characteristics (1) age and sex only
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Figure 3C: Changes in the Occupational-Prestige-Score Gaps between 
Rural-to-Urban and Urban-to-Urban Migrants over Time, High School
(3) (2) +premigration job age and sex only (2) (1) + parents' characteristics (1) age and sex only
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Figure 3D: Changes in the Occupational-Prestige-Score Gaps between Rural-to-
Urban and Urban-to-Urban Migrants over Time, More Than a High School 
Education
(3) (2) +premigration job age and sex only (2) (1) + parents' characteristics (1) age and sex only
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Data Appendix 
Occupational prestige score: 
Our measure of occupational prestige is the standardized z-score based on the mean level of education 
for each occupation (measure 1)1.After letting Eduj denote the average years of schooling of all 
individuals who work in occupation j, the z-score for the Eduj can be defined as follows:   
2
1
1 ( )
1
j
j N
j
j
Edu Edu
Z
Edu Edu
N 

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We calculate this score for each of the 253 occupations we observed in the 2003 dataset.  
We assume that the educational composition of the occupations does not change very much in the 
period of 1980-20032. One concern is that the emerging or new occupations might consist of younger 
people who are generally better educated than the older generations. To remove the differences in the 
average education across cohorts, we obtain the residuals from the regressions of education on a 
quadratic form of birth year for each correspondent (measure 2).  We then compute the z-score by the 
same formula we used above but using the residuals. Regression results3 using this method are similar 
to what we obtained from the z-scores based on raw education data.  
 
Below is a list of the most popular occupations 1 year after migration by rural migrants and their 
corresponding occupational-prestige score by two different measures:  
Code Occupation Occupational-
prestige score 
(Measure 1) 
Occupational-
prestige score 
(Measure 2) 
% workers in 
this occupation 
60 Self-employed -0.89 -.88 17.26 
411 
Shop employees and 
salespersons -0.31 
-.43 
7.61 
993 Simple laboring workers -0.91 -.86 5.08 
510 Planting workers -1.98 -1.72 4.57 
149 Transportation 
engineering technicians -0.97 
-.71 
4.06 
                                                            
1 We thank Albert Park for suggesting this measure. 
2 Xu (2000) compared four different scales from sociology studies and argued that there are changes in 
occupational-prestige scores for some occupations such as policeman and industrial and commercial 
administrators or tax officers. Although the scale we developed for this paper differs from the scales used by 
sociologists, the relative ranking is comparable. We also used the education level for observed individuals in the 
1980s and 1990s to construct the alternative measure (see next page), and the results were very similar to the 
current scale.  
3 These results are not presented in our paper but are available upon request. We also try the following: Rank 
occupational prestige based on the percentile distribution of the average education for occupations observed 
through 1980 to 2003. Analyses based on this measure are also similar to our preferred measures, except that the 
coefficients are on a different scale by definition (i.e., nonstandardized vs. standardized). 
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244 Primary school teachers 0.93 0.86 4.06 
Below are a few top occupations 1 year after migration by urban migrants and their corresponding 
occupational-prestige score by two different measures:     
Code Occupation Occupational-
prestige score 
(Measure 1) 
Occupational-
prestige score 
(Measure 2) 
% workers in 
this occupation  
213 Accounting staff 0.64 0.63 7.71 
310 Administrative staff 0.5 0.55 7.48 
42 
Leading cadres of 
health institutions 0.78 
1.09 
5.37 
411 
Shop employees and 
salespersons -0.31 
-0.43 
5.14 
421 Keepers -0.4 -0.28 4.91 
 
Job Mobility: 
The number of job changes and work-unit changes can be derived directly from the survey data. 
Below we describe how we define job promotions within the same work unit and across different 
units. 
By definition, a job promotion is the permanent movement of a staff member from a position in one 
job class to a position in another job class of increased responsibility or complexity of duties and in a 
higher salary range. To compare the skill requirement, responsibility, and relative pay and job benefits 
of within and across different work unit, we will briefly summarize the characteristics of each work 
unit and some description on the China’s economy reform prior to 2003.  
First, we divide the employment into two groups based on eight work unit types in our data:  
 I. 
(1) Party, government, or government agency or office (xingzheng jiguan) 
(2) State owned institution (shiye danwei4) 
II.  
(3) State-owned enterprise (SOE) 
(4) Collectively owned institution or enterprise 
(5) Individually operated enterprise 
(6) Private institution or enterprise 
                                                            
4 Our limitation is that we don’t have the details for the job at state-owned institutions (SOIs). First, there are 
three types of SOIs (全额拨款、差额拨款、自收自支事业单位), and some employees are based on temporary 
contract. The permanent /open-end contract employees in the first two types of the SOIs enjoy more job security 
and benefits.  
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(7) Foreign-investment enterprise 
(8) Others5 
The first group (Group I) is state owned, nonprofit, and has the highest job security and benefits of 
any group. The administrative rank only applies to this group and is a very important determinant of 
one’s wage level and other benefits.6 Within Group I, job-type 1 (party government, etc.) ranks higher 
than job-type 2 (SOE). We define a job promotion if one moves from work unit with a higher rank 
and work unit (1) ranks the highest, work unit (2) the second highest.  We will define further for other 
ranks within Group II.    
For within work unit change in (1) and (2), the rank of administration will be the second determinant.  
In particular, the following categories are ranks from low to high: (a) no rank; (b) below vice-section-
level; (c) vice-section-level (Fu keji); (d) section-level (keji); (e) vice-department-level (Fu chuji) (f) 
department level (Chu ji); (g) vice-bureau-level (fu juji); (h) bureau-level (ju ji); and higher.  
The supervision department level is a third determinant of job promotion, though it might be 
associated with the administrative rank in some cases. The fourth determinant would be housing and 
medical benefits.  
Compared to Group I, the work units in Group II have more autonomy and are for-profit. The 
administrative rank does not apply to these work units in general. It is worth noting that the state-
owned enterprises7 are a partial result of the economic reform of the state-owned sector.  
Before the economic reform, there was very little job diversity and mobility under the central 
administration. In urban areas, most of the jobs were state owned or in government offices, and they 
were called “iron-bowl” jobs, which references the very high job security of these positions. Once 
employed, a worker could stay employed until retirement age, except for voluntarily quitting or other 
reasons (such as health, etc). There was also a good amount of pension after retirement.  
The other sectors, mainly the private sectors, did not emerge until the economic reform in 1980s. It is 
well documented that after the market-oriented economic reform, there was a large number of layoffs 
of the employees from the state-own enterprises (Mako and Zhang, 2003). Between 1997 and 2001, 
the number of SOEs decreased from 262,000 to 174,000. Nonetheless, the wages of the “surviving” 
employees has increased rapidly (Parker, 1999). SOE assets have grown significantly, especially 
among centrally administrated SOEs.8 The Chinese government also used different policies to protect 
the SOEs, allowing them to offer above-market wages (Putterman, 1992; Chen, Demurger and 
Fournier, 2005; Zhao, 2002). Furthermore, even though the administrative rank was only available in 
government jobs, they applied to positions in the SOEs too until the political reform of recent years 
(Zheng Qi Fen Kai). This assures that most of the jobs at SOEs are superior to employment at other 
types of enterprises with a higher political and economic status both before and after the economic 
reform.9 
Therefore, the observed employees in the state-owned enterprises (job-type 2) are assumed to enjoy a 
higher wage benefit (including bonuses, higher job security, and a lower risk of enterprise 
bankruptcy). 
                                                            
5 For the “others” category, there were very few cases in our data. We treat them as the lowest rank in terms of 
job preference. So any move from “others” to the other seven types of work units would be treated as upward 
mobility. 
6 See, for example, “公务员职务级别工资标准对应表”.  
7 See, for example, Meng and Perkins (1998) for a definition and more information about SOEs.  
8 The average asset size of centrally-administered SOEs has more than doubled since 1997(Mako and Zhang, 
2003). 
9 Zhao (2002) finds that state-sector workers in China earned significantly more than workers in urban-
collective and domestic-private enterprises in 1996 when the value of nonwage benefits is included. 
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There are four types of enterprises not owned by the state: collectively owned institutions or 
enterprises; individually operated enterprises; private institutions or enterprises; and foreign 
investment enterprises.  
It is important to take the government’s supervisory department into consideration when defining job 
promotion for these enterprises. For our analysis, we will define upward mobility as occurring when 
the individual transfers from non-SOE to an SOE that is under the supervision of a department either 
at a central or a provincial level of government.10  
Consequently, job mobility is also defined as being upward (b) district or county (d) street or township 
(e) neighbourhood or village-committee or (f) other level to a centrally or provincially administered 
SOE. A transfer to the central level is considered to be the highest level of upward mobility.11  
There is one exception to these classifications. Research shows that the skilled workers in foreign 
investment enterprises (FIE) earned more than skilled workers in SOEs in 1990s (Zhao, 2002). 
Moreover, FIEs are considerably more profitable (especially for those FIEs under a higher level of 
government supervision) than other non-SOEs. Therefore, if a person moved from any work units in 
Group 2 to an FIE, and the management level at the previous job is considered to be lower than the 
management level at the FIE (the new job), we will define it as upward mobility as well. Here 
management level is a proxy of skills.  
For all the non-SOEs, job security is the highest in collectively owned institutions, where the 
decisions of hiring and firing reside among the workers’ union. Additionally, job security is relatively 
equal among most of the workers. Therefore, any job changes from other non-SOEs to collectively 
owned institutions or enterprises are considered to be upward mobility. One exception to this 
classification is that we consider moves to individually operated enterprises, private institutions or 
enterprises, or FIEs to be upward mobility if and only if the supervisory level is higher at the new 
job.12  
Finally, upward mobility is considered to occur for changes from farming or joining the army to any 
other type of work.    
                                                            
10 Our limitation here is that we have no information on the details of the work unit, for example, the location. 
According to Mako and Zhang (2003), SOE profitability varies by locality as well. We could identify the 
location of the work unit at a provincial level only if the individual has not moved or migrated and thus be able 
to assign the current residential province to the work-unit location.  
11 Ideally, we would also like to look at the occupational code of the employees. Because certain SOE sectors 
are losing, including building materials, chemicals, forestry, food processing, textiles, machinery, urban utilities, 
construction, transportation and storage, and commerce. Therefore, for workers moving up one level to the 
supervisory department, upward mobility is only defined if the second occupation is not within any of these 
industries. However, in the data, the coding of the industry is only available for the most current job. 
12 This is because there is a legal obligation for the department that offers affiliation. The rank of the 
supervisory or presiding department for the work unit can reveal some information on the size of the enterprise 
(i.e., the higher the rank, the larger the size of the enterprise), and the more funding or higher reputation the 
enterprise might have.  
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Years of Schooling: 
The following table shows how we convert the different educational levels reported in the CGSS into 
the number of years of schooling. 
Education Level Original Coding  Years of schooling 
Never attended school formally 0 0 
Primary school13 1 6 
Middle school 2 9 
High school 3 12 
Vocational high school or 
technical school 
4 12 
High-school-level professional 
school 
5 12 
Specialized college  (part-time) 6 14 
Specialized college (full-time)  7 14 
University (part-time) 8 16 
University (full-time) 9 16 
Graduate school and higher  10 18 
Traditional apprentice learning 
(si-shu)14  
11 11 
 
Please note that we could not distinguish the differences from high school, vocational high school, 
and high-school-level professional school from the total years of schooling.  We treat full-time and 
part-time college the same in terms of years of schooling, even though the part-time track might take 
longer to finish in reality.  
 
 
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
13 It is worth noting that primary schools consisted of about five years of schooling in the earlier days.  
14 This is the private schooling in the old days, where only traditional Chinese lectures were taught. It is hard to 
assign the number of years in school for this category; however, the conventional wisdom is that private 
schooling is offered until up to the age of 16. Nonetheless, there were fewer than five observations in this 
category in our final dataset.  
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Migration Reasons: 
The following are a list of reasons of migration surveyed in CGSS and the corresponding explanation 
of selective terms.  
Coding Reasons of migration 
1 Attending school (sheng xue);  
2 Joining the Army ; 
3 Looking for work (“out-for-work” in CGSS English survey) (da gong);  
4 Worker-to-cadre transfer (zhuan gan)  
5 Labour recruitment (zhao gong) 
6 Support the inner or border regions (zhi nei or zhi bian) 
7 “up to the mountains and down to the village” (shang shan xia xiang)  
8 Migrated with the family  
9 Job transfer  
10 Self-purchase of valid local urban hukou (e.g., “blue-stamp” (lan ben hukou) or “self-grain” 
(zi li kou liang hukou) ).    
11 Purchasing a house from (or building a house with) a company with a hukou quota 
12 Residential changes  
13 Transfer along with the work unit (dan wei)  
14 Urban development or expansion  
15 State policy 
16 Expropriation of land 
17 Moving to live close to relatives 
 
Explanations on selective terms: 
Attending school (shengxue): This generally refers to going to college in an urban area. 
Worker-tocadre transfer (zhuan-gan): This refers to transfers from worker to cadre (gong zhuan gan), 
which began to occur at the beginning of the open-reform policy period. In China, workers and cadres 
have differences not only in terms of salary but also social welfare benefits (housing, medical, pension) 
etc. In general it is difficult for workers from collective ownership to transfer to state-owned sectors. 
In a state meeting in December 1979, this means of transfer was targeted for elimination due to a 
series of problems insulted from “zhuan gan” (for instance, corruption) . Additionally, as of 1993, 
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China began to use open examination to recruit civil servants, and everyone has to pass a desired level 
of the national civil-servant exam in order to work at a government sector or state-owned institution.   
Labour recruitment (zhao-gong): This means being employed (in an urban area). The term is different 
than da gong. Looking for work (da gong; i.e., going to work in an urban area with qualifications). In 
recent years, the term da gong has been used more frequently than zhao-gong.  Zhao-gong refers to 
the period when the state created employment in urban factories for heavy industrial development.   
Supporting the inner and border regions (zhi nei /zhi bian) and “up to the mountains and down to the 
village” (shang shan xia xiang): These are some terms related to the Cultural Revolution. During the 
revolution, many people became jobless. From 1968, many young people were sent to rural areas to 
“learn from the farmers.” Most of them were only 16 to20 years old, and were therefore not able to 
continue high school or college. After the Cultural Revolution, they were able to leave the countryside 
through various means, including “zhao gong,” “joining the army,” and “going to college.”   
Migrated with the family (jia shu sui zhuan) and moving to live close to relatives (tou kao qin qi): 
This mainly refers to (a) seniors who reside in rural areas and could move into the cities where their 
children reside and (b) children who reside in rural areas and could move into the cities where their 
parents reside.  
Self-purchase of valid local urban hukou (e.g., “blue-stamp” (lan ben hukou) or “self-grain” (zi li 
kou liang hukou) ) purchasing a house from (or building a house with) a company with a hukou quota: 
These fall into the category of “blue stamp” hukou relaxation policy, which attracts investment 
through the real estate market and highly educated people. 
Residential changes: Moving from one apartment to another in a different residential district within a 
city. “Such changes in residence are driven in part by housing reforms in urban China, which give 
urban residents the opportunity to own their own apartment/house or improve their living space and to 
gain access to other amenities” (Liang & Ma, 2004, 476-477). 
Terms 13-16 in the table above refer to state policy related to urban development or work-unit 
changes due to state economic reform. 
 
 
 
